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OBJECTIVE: TAX AVOIDANCE; CLAY BROWN AND THE
THREE-PARTY SALE AND LEASEBACK
I.
THE THREE-PARTY SALE AND LEASEBACK
In the recent decision of Commissioner v. Clay B. Brown,' the
Supreme Court held that the sale of a business to an exempt organization
as part of a three-party sale and leaseback does not automatically deprive
the seller of capital gains treatment. That decision will surely result in
an even greater utilization of "bootstrap" transactions as a method of
tax avoidance, 2 for the dreams of the entrepreneur can now be realized
with a minimum of risk. The three-party sale and leaseback, as well as
other "bootstrap devices," can be safely employed to secure an effective
return of profits at capital gains rates.
The three-party sale and leaseback involves several basic transactions.
First, the stock of the vendor, typically a closely-held corporation, is pur-
chased by a "middleman," usually a tax-exempt organization. The original
corporation is then liquidated, with a stipulated amount of the liquidated
assets being paid to the sellers as a down payment. A new operating
company is then formed under the control of either the seller or a
trusted associate with nominal capital. Finally, the newly-formed company
leases the fixed assets of the liquidated corporation from the "middleman,"
the consideration being a fixed percentage (usually 80 per cent) of the
net profits of the operating company. The "middleman" is in turn
obligated to pay a percentage of this sum (usually 90 per cent) to the
seller in satisfaction of a non-interest bearing note or similar obligation
given to secure the purchase price of the stock.
The primary motive behind the sale and leaseback is, as previously
noted, tax avoidance. 3 The rental payments of the operating company
are deductible as operating expenses, and, if the "middleman" is an exempt
organization, these payments are not taxable.4 In addition, the seller
treats his return from the sale as capital gain.
1. 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
2. For an exhaustive analysis of the many facets of the "bootstrap sale" see
Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Business, 108 U. PA. L. REv.
623, 943 (1960). See also, Moore & Dohan, Sales, Churches, and Monkeyshines,
11 TAX L. Riv. 87 (1956) ; Alexander, The Use of Foundations in Business, 15
N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 591 (1957); Comment, The Three-Party
Sale and Lease-back, 61 MicH. L. Rlv. 1140 (1963).
3. See, Cary, Corporate Financing, Through the Sale and Lease-back of
Property: Business, Tax and Policy Considerations, 62 HARV. L. R v. 1 (1948), for
an extensive discussion of the advantages of the sale and lease-back in the area of
corporate finance. The article contains an excellent discussion of the non-tax advan-
tages of the sale and lease-back.
4. The exempt organization's status will usually result in a higher purchase price
for the seller due to the fact that it is capable of a quicker pay-back than a taxable
buyer (earnings before taxes higher). But a taxable buyer may be on an equal footing
with an exempt organization if he has operating loss carryovers, or if the amount of
depreciation and other non-cash deductions generated by the transferred assets are
sufficient. See Dauber, Jewell & Hall, Supreme Court in Brown Allows Capital Gain
on "Bootstrap" Sale to Charity, 23 J. TAXATION 2, 3 (1965).
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Finally, there may be an added tax advantage to the seller where his
property is of a nondepreciable character or has been fully depreciated;
for the sale and leaseback in effect results in a writing-off of the
entire property, including land and other nondepreciable assets. Indeed,
the rental payments themselves provide one method of securing accelerated
depreciation. The relevance of this "depreciation factor" with regard
to the three-party sale and leaseback is, however, dependent upon effective
control or at least ownership of the stock of the operating company
remaining in the hands of the sellers of the liquidated corporation.
Considerations of corporate finance and the control factor noted above
point up the particular suitability of the exempt organization as the
"middleman" in a leaseback arrangement. The private investor is unlikely
to favor the leaseback over other types of loans, even though the average
return from leaseback transactions has been estimated at 3/8 per cent
higher than any other form of debt financing, since rental payments re-
ceived under the lease would be reportable on the investor's tax return
while the repayment of a loan would have no taxable effect. It is
this indifference of the exempt organization as to how receipts from an
investment are to be reported on its return that makes the widespread use
of the sale and leaseback practicable. 5
II.
THE EXEMPT ORGANIZATION
The exemption from taxation provided by section 501(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is extended by section 501 (c) (3) to:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for the public safety, literary or educational purposes, or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual....
Definition of the requirements set forth by this section has entailed con-
siderable legislative and judicial effort.6
A. The Organization Requirement
While the best evidence of the purpose of an organization is usually
found in its articles of incorporation, 7 the charter is not conclusive, and
extrinsic evidence may be admitted to prove a charitable purpose.8 Nor
5. Cary, supra note 3, at 28.
6. See cases collected at 69 A.L.R.2d 871 (1960).
7. Estate of Sharpe v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 612 (1944), aff'd, 148 F.2d 179
(3d Cir. 1945).
8. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Battle Creek, 126 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Roche's
Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938) ; Cochran v. Commissioner,
78 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1935).
2
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will incorporation under general corporation laws, rather than as a non-
profit organization, preclude exemption if, in fact, the corporation is
organized for a proper purpose.9 Such ambiguities may be resolved by
discerning the actual purposes for which the corporation is operated, 10
which is largely a question of fact to be determined by an examination of
the intentions and motives behind the formation of the charitable entity.
In this regard, it has been stated that "[To] some degree, 'organized' cannot
be divorced from 'operated,' for the true purposes of organization may well
have to be drawn in final analysis from the manner in which the corpora-
tion has been operated."" Finally, it should be noted that a charter of a
charitable corporation which delegates broad powers of administration to
its directors will not compel a holding that the corporation was not
organized exclusively to achieve proper ends - powers are not to be
equated with purposes.'
2
As to the requirement of exclusiveness, the Supreme Court held, in
Better Business Bureau v. United States,13 that the presence of one non-
exempt purpose, if substantial in character, would destroy the exemption,
regardless of the number or importance of non-exempt purposes. That
decision was interpreted by the Tax Court in The Marian Foundation14
to require that a corporation be organized "primarily" for charitable
purposes, and stated the test of exemption to be that "activities which do
not serve directly to further an exempt purpose must be minor in
comparison to exempt activities." The Marian decision, when viewed
in the light of the purpose-power distinction of Danz clearly indicates
that an exempt organization can engage in limited business activities and
still retain its exempt status.
B. The Operation Requirement
But even if organized exclusively for charitable purposes, a corporation
does not satisfy code requirements unless it is also operated exclusively
for such ends. The question of operation, like that of organization, is
essentially one of fact.'3 Probably the most crucial problem in this regard
arises where exempt organizations engage in competition with private
business. What appears to be the better view has favored a liberal con-
9. See, e.g., Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 948
(2d Cir. 1945) ; Commissioner v. Battle Creek, Inc., 126 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942).
10. Hillcrest Country Club, Inc. v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Mo.
1957); Kanawha-Roane Lands, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.W.Va.
1955).
11. Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74, 85 (D.N.J.
1956).
12. Commissioner v. John Danz Charitable Trust, 284 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960).
13. 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
14. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 99 (1960).
15. Marie and Alex Manoogian Fund v. United States, 24 T.C. 412 (1955),
appeal dismissed, 232 F.2d 758 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 929 (1956) ; Cummins-
Collins Foundation v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 613 (1950).
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struction in light of the expressed public policy to exempt income devoted
to charity.' 6
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores,17 a case involving the sale
of small quantities of goods by a religious order on a non-competitive
basis illustrates this position. There the Supreme Court stated in dicta
that the destination, and not the source, of income was the ultimate test
of exemption. The Sagrada dicta was subsequently expanded to exempt
income derived by a charity from its operation of a home for the aged
in competition with private business,' 8 and, in the controversial Roche's
Beachl" case, to allow exemption to a corporation whose entire earnings
from the operation of a large bathing beach were channeled to the charity
which owned all of its stock. Under the "destination of income test"
there was no basis for distinguishing between a charitable corporation
which carried on a private enterprise and a private corporation organized
and operated to "feed" an exempt organization.
Judge Learned Hand strongly dissented in Roche's Beach, asserting
that the tax-exempt status of a corporation should be dependent upon
its own activities and purposes, rather than those of the ultimate recipient
of the income. Judge Hand based his opinion upon section 103 of the
Code,20 which included within the category of exempt organizations a
corporation organized for the purposes of collecting income to be sub-
sequently paid over to such an organization. As it was "the purpose of
subdivision 14 to tax all business income, however destined, unless the
company was really not in business at all," the exemption of a feeder's
income, and, implicitly, that of a charity which operated a business for
profit, could not be justified under section 101(6) .21 Nevertheless, subse-
quent decisions sanctioned the application of "the destination of income
approach" to the feeder as well as to the charity.
22
The abuses involved where a charity or its feeder engage in competi-
tive enterprise to secure tax-free income for the support of charitable
activities are obvious; for the status of the charitable organization permits
it to reinvest a greater amount of its profits than its non-exempt competi-
tors. In addition, the exempt organization, through the use of the sale
and leaseback arrangement, is able to borrow the amount of the purchase
price and repay the loan (and interest) with rentals derived from the
16. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) ; Helvering v.
Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150 (1934).
17. 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
18. Sands Springs Home, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927).
19. Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
20. Now § 501 (c) (2) of Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
21. Now § 501 (c) (3) of Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
22. See, e.g., C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951)
Willingham v. Home Oil Mill, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852
(1950) ; Commissioner v. Ortin, 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949) ; Debs Memorial Radio
Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1945). See the following cases
contra: e.g., United States v. Community Services, Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951).
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932 (1952) ; Universal Oil Products Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d
451 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850, rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 894 (1950)
Bear Gulch Water Co. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1941).
[VOL. 11
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acquired property. After recouping the purchase price, the charity can
continue to lease the property or sell at a clear profit. This type of
activity meets objection on several grounds.2 3 First, the charity is "trading
on its exemption," since its sole contribution to the leaseback transaction
is its tax exempt status. Secondly, where rentals are lower or the sales price
higher than would be the case with a non-exempt purchaser-lessor, the
sale and/or leaseback becomes, in effect a sale of the charity's exemption.
Thirdly, continued use of the sale and leaseback by charities might
eventually result in serious reductions in the over-all tax base.
The Revenue Act of 195024 was adopted by Congress to deal with
these competitive problems and particularly those arising in the area
of the sale and leaseback. The approach taken in the Act was to tax
the income of exempt organizations on an equal basis with that of non-
exempt organizations in so far as it was derived from an "unrelated trade
or business."'25 The "destination of income test" was retained with regard
to organizations other than feeders. With respect to feeders, however,
Judge Hand's dissent in Roche's Beach became law. The Act provided
that income derived from the operation of a trade or business carried
on for profit would not be exempt merely because it is payable in toto
to an exempt organization. 26 The tax thus imposed on business income
is limited by section 511 to income received by exempt organizations
actively engaged in the operation of an "unrelated trade or business."
"Passive income," such as that received as dividends, interest, royalties and
rents, is excluded from the tax.
27
Section 514 is aimed specifically at the evils engendered by the
sale and leaseback transaction. It provides an exception to the rental
exclusion of section 512(b), by taxing as "unrelated business income"
rents received from leases of real property for more than five years
where there is an outstanding indebtedness at the end of the taxable year
incurred by the lessor in acquiring or improving the property. Leases
for five years or less, however, escape taxation. However, if there is
an option to renew, the renewal period must be added to the term of
the lease to determine whether it falls within the exclusion. 28 Further,
income from the lease is subject to the tax if the property has been
23. Dane, Taxation of Charities under Revenue Act of 1950, 9 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE
ON FEDERAL TAXATION 895, 896 (1951).
24. The Revenue Act of 1950 amended § 101 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, and added,
§§ 421-24, 3813 and 3814. These sections are now §§ 501-04 and 511-14 of Int. Rev.
Code of 1954. Citations with regard to the Act are keyed to the 1954 Code.
25. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 502.
26. The term "unrelated trade or business" is defined by § 513(a) : "the term
'unrelated trade or business' means, in the case of any organization subject to the tax
imposed by section 511, any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially
related (aside from the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it
makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of
its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its
exemption under section 501 .. "
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 512(b).
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 514(b) (2) (A).
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occupied by the same lessee for a total period of more than five years
from or after the date the exempt organization acquired the property.2 9
The Revenue Act also listed certain prohibited transactions 30 and
proscribed accumulations of income which are so "unreasonable in amount
or duration" that the function of the organization constituting the basis
for exemption cannot be accomplished. 3 1 The penalty for violation of these
sections is loss of exemption.
3 2
C. Private Inurement of Income
Section 501 (c) (3) establishes the further limitation that net income
of the organization may not inure to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual. 33 This section, however, has received a narrow construction.
Thus, in Ohio Furnace Company, Inc.,34 a foundation organized for educa-
tional purposes acquired the stock of Ohio Furnace, giving the seller a
series of notes for the purchase price. The net earnings of the Furnace
Company, in accordance with the terms of its charter, were paid to the
foundation and constituted its only income. The foundation was obligated,
in turn, by the terms of the sales agreement to pay substantially all of
its earnings to the sellers of the stock. As a result, no disbursements of
funds were made by the foundation for charitable purposes during the
period in question. The Commissioner contended that the payments con-
stituted an inurement of income to private individuals. The Tax Court
rejected this contention, holding that the foundation's investment was a
sound one made in good faith at arm's length and for a reasonable price,
and that it could have been directed to no other end than to ultimately
benefit the educational purposes of the organization. Several "private
inurement cases" subsequent to Ohio Furnace have adopted the rationale
of that case, emphasizing the soundness of the investment and the reason-
ableness of price as crucial factors.35
29. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 514(b) (2) (B).
30. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 503. Certain organizations exempt under
§ 501 (c) (3) are excluded from the coverage of this section and § 504, infra, by
§ 503(b). The presence or absence of an arm's-length transaction is crucial in
determining whether or not the transaction is prohibited. See, Powell, Foundations:
Prohibited Activities, 14 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 61 (1956).
31. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 504(a). See Mansfield, Foundations: Unrea-
sonable Accumulations, 14 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 47 (1956).
32. In the case of a violation of § 503(d), exemption is lost, in most instances, for
the taxable years after the year during which the organization is notified of violation.
Exemption can be reinstated upon application if the Secretary is satisfied that future
violations will not occur (§ 503(a), (d)). In the case of violation of § 504, the exemp-
tion is lost only for the taxable year in which the unreasonable accumulation occurred
(§ 504(a)).
33. Treas. Reg. No. 111 §§ 29.101-1, 29.101-2(d).
34. 25 T.C. 179 (1955).
35. Commissioner v. Howes Leather Co., 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959); Knapp
Bros. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 899 (Ct. Cl. 1956) ; A. Shiffman, 32 T.C. 1073
(1959). In the Shiffman case, the Commissioner contended that the foundation's use
of its income to repay its indebtedness constituted an unreasonable accumulation of
income for non-exempt purposes. The court rejected this contention holding that even
assuming that the use of the income of the foundation to pay an indebtedness incurred
in acquiring property was an accumulation of income, in the case at bar (facts of case








THE CLAY BROWN DEcISION
A. Background
3 6
The Clay Brown leaseback arrangement was essentially the basic
three-party sale and leaseback described above. Negotiations were real,
at arm's-length and in good faith, and both parties had a clear business
purpose in entering into the agreement. Clay Brown and Company was
able to sell at a price agreeable to it,37 and the foundation obtained funds
from the retention of 10 per cent of the rental payments. After the note
for the purchase price had been paid, the charity would obtain full title to
the property.38 Further, as the lease executed was for a five-year period,
the rental payments received by the foundation would be tax-exempt.8 9
Nor was the foundation under any obligation to make payments on the
principal unless rental payments were received from the operating com-
pany. However, in the event that a designated minimum was not realized
in any two consecutive years, the sellers could declare the entire balance
due and payable. If payment was not then forthcoming, a mortgage on the
fixed assets executed to secure the note could be foreclosed. The operating
company was organized with "more than nominal capital," 40 and its stock
held by Clay Brown's attorneys, who also comprised its board of directors.
No shareholders of Clay Brown and Company retained any interest in the
newly-formed corporation, although a managerial contract was executed
with Clay Brown which reserved to the holders of a majority interest in
the principal note the right to appoint a successor should he later resign.
Brown later relinquished this position and the right to appoint his suc-
cessor was waived.
In a Revenue Ruling which concerned an agreement basically similar
to the Clay Brown sale and leaseback, the Commissioner stated that the
transaction should not be treated as producing a long-term capital gain
for Federal income tax purposes.41 Consequently, when the shareholders
of Clay Brown and Company reported the amounts received under this
agreement as capital gain the Commissioner assessed a deficiency, and
respondents thereupon commenced the present action.
The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's position, holding that
the transaction constituted a bona fide sale consummated after arm's-
36. The facts presented below are essentially the findings of fact of the Tax Court
(37 T.C. 461 (1961)).
37. As of January 31, 1953 the adjusted net worth of Clay Brown and Company
was $619,457.63 of which $448,471.63 was accumulated earnings. The appraised value
as of that date was $1,064,877. The sale price was $1,300,000 (date of sale was
February 4, 1953).
38. The foundation's chief reason for entering the transaction was to obtain full
title to the properties and sell them to procure money for use in cancer research.
39. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 514.
40. The operating company was capitalized at $25,000, the capital being paid in
by its stockholders from their own funds.
41. Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 128.
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length negotiations which resulted in a reasonable price,42 and that the
sellers were entitled to capital gains treatment on their return from the
sale.43 The court deemed the fact that legal title was transferred for a
consideration and the sellers would eventually yield all interest in the
property controlling. Considerable reliance was placed on Union Bank
v. United States,"4 a case factually similar to Clay Brown, where the
Court of Claims found the sellers had retained only a security interest
in the property and concluded that ". . . it is logically and legally impossible
for an owner to part with his property for a consideration without selling
it."4 5 On appeal, the Tax Court's decision was affirmed. 46 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
4 7
B. The Commissioner - An All or Nothing Approach
The Commissioner made a substance over form argument, emphasizing
the "economic realities ' 48 of the sale and leaseback transaction. He con-
tended that while in form there had been a sale, in substance the vendor
retained such an economic interest in and control over the property as
to preclude the possibility of there being a "sale or exchange" for capital
gains purposes. The sellers of Clay Brown and Company had not
sufficiently severed their interest in the property to warrant being con-
sidered as having converted a capital asset into a capital gain or loss.
According to the Commissioner, there would be no "sale" of the stock
until all payments had been made. The income transferred from the
operating company to the sellers constituted a "return of profit" resulting
from a gratuitous transfer of stock to the foundation, 49 and should there-
fore be taxed as ordinary income."0
42. Subsequent decisions have taken the same factual analysis approach with
regard to determining if a bona fide sale has taken place as that taken in Brown. The
existence of an arm's-length transaction, the adequacy of capitalization and the man-
agement of the operating company are important factors to consider. The existence
of real negotiations is crucial in determining whether the purchase price is a reason-
able one. See Royal Farms Dairy Co., 40 T.C. 172 (1963) ; Anderson Dairy, Inc.,
39 T.C. 1027 (1963).
43. Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461 (1961).
44. 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
45. Id. at 128. The following cases are in accord with the rationale of Union
Bank and the Tax Court's decision in Clay B. Brown: Royal Farms Dairy Co., 40
T.C. 172 (1963) ; Anderson Dairy, Inc., 39 T.C. 1027 (1963) ; Ralph M. Singer, 22
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 996 (1963); Isis Windows, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 837
(1963) ; Oscar C. Stahl, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 996 (1963). Cf. Earnest G. Howes,
30 T.C. 909, aff'd sub nonm., Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959)
Estate of Truschel, 29 T.C. 433 (1957).
46. 325 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1963).
47. 377 U.S. 962 (1963).
48. The basis for this "economic realities" approach was laid in Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). That case involved a transaction which the Supreme
Court held was "an operation having no business or corporate purpose - a new
device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for conceal-
ing its real character .. " Id. at 469. The Tax Court had distinguished Gregory
on the basis of its finding that there was a clear business purpose in the Clay Brown
transaction.
49. Dauber, Jewell & Hall, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2.
50. Taxing the seller's returns as dividends, the Commissioner treated the business
in their hands as a wasting asset under § 167 I.R.C., and allowed them to offset their
bases in the stock against payments received.
[VOL. 11
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1. An Economic Interest Approach
As the sellers' receipt of the purchase price depended solely upon the
earnings of the operating company, they retained the economic risk,
although legal title passed to the foundation. The Commissioner contended
that this precluded a sale for capital gains purposes, reasoning that if the
entire risk were to remain with the sellers, the foundation investing
nothing and assuming no independent obligation to pay the purchase
price, there would necessarily be a "price" for this risk bearing. Con-
sequently, that portion of the purchase price over and above the fair
market value of the stock would represent future earnings. As the
purpose of the capital gains tax is to alleviate the appreciation of value
accrued over a substantial period of time from being taxed at a high
rate in the year of sale5' and is not applied to future income, he argued that
capital gains treatment under section 1222(3) I.R.C.5 2 should be denied.
While there was no direct authority for this approach, a convincing
analogy could be made to certain cases in the natural resources field,
where the characterization of an agreement as a "sale or lease" by the
parties was disregarded in order to ascertain the economic realities of the
particular transaction. In these cases, where the seller retained an interest
in the oil and gas in place and looked solely to their extraction for a return
of capital, it was generally held that the payments constituted ordinary
income subject to depletion allowance,53 even though the parties might
have characterized the particular transaction as a "sale." The fact that the
seller's return was dependent solely upon production was deemed suffi-
cient to render capital gains treatment inappropriate.
This position was adopted in Burnet v. Harmel,54 a case which in-
volved the leasing of oil and gas rights in exchange for cash bonus
payments5" and stipulated royalties56 dependent upon production by the
lessee. The Supreme Court, in denying capital gains treatment to the
bonus payments as well as the royalties, ruled that passage of title to the
lessee was only incidental to the use of the land for oil production. The
operation viewed as a whole was not a sale or a conversion of capital
assets:
• . . it is evident that the taxation of the receipts of the lessor as
income does not ordinarily produce the kind of hardship aimed at
51. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
52. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222(3) defines a long term capital gain as "gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than six months, if and to the
extent such gain is taken into account in computing gross income."
53. See, e.g., Commission v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956)
Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946) ; Kirby Petroleum Co. v.
Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946) ; Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937);
Palmer v. Bender, 387 U.S. 551 (1933); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
But see Barker v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957); Crowell Land and
Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Maude W. Olinger,
27 T.C. 93 (1956).
54. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
55. A cash bonus payment is a cash down payment.
56. A royalty is a right to receive a certain percentage of the proceeds of mineral
exploitation, usually a one-eighth interest.
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by the capital gains provision of the taxing act. Oil and gas may
or may not be present in the leased premises, and may or may not be
found by the lessee. If found, their abstraction from the soil is a
time-consuming operation and the payments made by the lessee to
the lessor do not normally become payable as the result of a single
transaction within the taxable year, as in the case of a sale of prop-
erty.57
Implicit in this decision is the proposition that where a vendor's return is
dependent upon production yielding income recurrently over a period
of more than one year, he has retained such an economic interest in the
property as to render capital gains treatment improper.
58
Perhaps the closest parallel to the sale and leaseback transaction in
the oil and gas cases is to be found in transactions where the consideration
consists solely of oil production payments, that is, an amount payable to
the transferor out of proceeds from the sale of the oil transferred in the
form of a specified amount of a certain fraction of production. When the
transferor has received the purchase price, his interest in the oil in place
terminates and the entire risk of production falls to the transferee. In
one such case, Thomas v. Perkins,9 the Supreme Court held that the
lessor's income was taxable at ordinary income rates. While the fact that
the transferor's right to the oil payments was fixed in amount and would
not vary directly with the severance of minerals from the soil was
indicative of a "sale," it was outweighed by the fact that the lessor's
income was dependent on production and could only be realized over a
period of years.
Subsequently, in Anderson v. Helvering,60 the Perkins decision was
limited to situations where oil payments were derived solely from produc-
tion. There the agreement provided that oil payments to the transferor
be paid from half of the oil produced and from any sale of land. The
Court held that, as the payments could be satisfied from the sale of the
property itself, the economic risk argument was inapplicable and "the
reserved payments must be treated as payments received upon a sale.... ,,0x
This rationale imposes a "necessity restriction" on the application of the
economic interest approach. If payments to the lessor are not necessarily
dependent upon production, and there is a possibility of payment from
another source, the transaction will be regarded as a "sale" warranting
capital gains treatment. The Commissioner asserted that this "necessity
restriction" was not applicable to the Clay Brown situation since the
sellers' return was solely dependent on the production of the operating
company.
57. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932).
58. See Lanning, supra note 2, at 650. In Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933),
the Supreme Court held that the right to a depletion allowance (and therefore whether
the return of the "seller" is to be treated as ordinary income or capital gain) is
dependent on retention of economic interest and not retention of ownership.
59. 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
60. 301 U.S. 404 (1940).
61. Id. at 412.
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2. Retention of Control
Control of the fixed assets of the operating company, in effect, re-
mained in Clay Brown and his associates. The Commissioner contended
that as the sellers retained this substantial control, they had not sufficiently
severed their interest so as to warrant capital gains treatment. Again the
"economic realities" of the transaction were stressed.
An analogous situation existed in Higgins v. Smith,62 where the loss
on the sale of securities by a sole stockholder to his wholly-owned corpo-
ration for no valid business purpose was denied. The Court reasoned that
as the "command of income and its benefits" remained in the seller, he
was the true owner of the property and had incurred no loss. And as
was stated in Corless v. Bowers: 3 ". .. taxation is not so much concerned
with the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the prop-
erty taxed - the actual benefit for which the tax is paid."6 4 Applying
this thesis to the sale and leaseback transaction, the Commissioner argued
there must be a substantial change in the seller's economic position so as
to make it reasonable to treat him as a recipient of income for tax pur-
poses,6 5 and contended that such a change had not been effected by the
Clay Brown arrangement.
B. The Court's Decision
I. Definition of a "Sale"
The Supreme Court in holding that capital gains treatment
was appropriate in Clay Brown, rejected the Commissioner's contention
that the method or source of payment is crucial in defining a sale
within the meaning of section 1222(3) I.R.C. Instead it adopted the
ordinary meaning of that term as being merely dependent upon the
seller's transfer of a property interest, and ruled that a sale is transacted
whenever there is "a transfer of property for a fixed sum payable in
money." And retention of a mere creditor's interest as opposed to a
proprietary one, as was the case in Clay Brown, was not deemed a sufficient
basis to deny the existence of a sale. Nor does the presence of a recapture
provision in the agreement to take effect upon default transform a creditor's
interest into one proprietary in nature.
The Court asserted that the literal meaning of the term "sale" adopted
in Clay Brown was in no way inconsistent with the purposes behind the
62. 308 U.S. 473 (1940). The approach taken in Higgins was based on Gregory
v. Helvering, supra note 48.
63. 281 U.S. 376 (1930). Accord, Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355 (1939).
64. Id. at 378.
65. Cf. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1940).
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capital gains provisions of the Code. Indeed, the substantial accumulated
earnings of Clay Brown and Company were held to be sufficient evidence
of the appreciated value of the vendor's stock sold.66 Dismissing the Com-
missioner's assertion that this "excessive burden" was not present since
payment would be realized over a period of years, the Court relied
heavily upon Congressional rejection of a recent Treasury proposal which
would have treated payments on the sale of a capital asset which are
deferred over more than five years and contingent on future income as
ordinary income.6 7 The Court deemed it significant that the proposal did
not challenge the occurrence of a sale in such a transaction. But even
more important was Congress' failure to deny capital gains treatment to
contingent payments deferred over more than five years.
2. The Commissioner's Argument - "'A Case of Overkill"
In rejecting the Commissioner's argument that the seller's retention
of risk and control prevented the execution of a sale for capital gains
purposes,68 the Court dismissed the "realities approach," adverting to the
fact that the sellers of Clay Brown had no interest in the foundation or
the operating company. While Clay Brown had the right to control and
manage the operating company, he had subsequently relinquished it and
the Court did not view the ownership of the operating company by Clay
Brown's attorneys as a retention of control by the sellers.
The existence of an excessive purchase price was essential to the
Commissioner's economic interest approach. However, the Court, relying
on the Tax Court's determination that the sales price was within a reason-
able range in light of the financial position of the seller and the result of
real negotiations conducted at arm's-length, found the price to be reason-
able. The oil and gas case analogy was rejected as inapplicable, since the
extraction of mineral resources is an income-producing operation, and
not a conversion of capital assets. Further, percentage depletion (and
therefore ordinary income treatment) is solely dependent upon production,
while the policy behind the capital gains tax is concerned with the appre-
ciation in value of an asset over cost.69
But the Court's decision did not result in a complete rejection of
the risk-shifting approach. By its consideration of the "excessive price
issue," the Court implicitly recognized that a transaction would be struck
down as "no sale" when the price was found to be unreasonable. Capital
gains treatment would be improper in such a situation, not because risk
66. See note 37, supra.
67. Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 154-56 (1963).
68. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, with whom Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Black agreed, adopted the approach of the Commissioner.
69. The Court added that even if the oil and gas cases were deemed analogous,
the doctrine of Anderson v. Helvering would preclude its application to the Clay Brown
situation since the sellers, in case of default could foreclose their mortgage on the
fixed assets of the foundation.
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had not shifted, but rather because the lack of risk-shifting would be
reflected in an excessive purchase price not attributable to appreciation
in the value of the asset.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, dissenting, asserted that the logic of the Court
would preclude such a restriction. The situation where an excessive price
results from real bargaining at arm's-length would be no different in
so far as risk-shifting, transfer of ownership and the consideration given
by the buyer are concerned, than an instance in which a reasonable price
had been reached in the same manner. He concluded that the Court would
have no basis in light of its reasoning in Clay Brown to hold that such a
transaction did not constitute a "sale" unless the-price was shown to be
grossly excessive."0
According to the majority, the Commissioner's approach was "a clear
case of overkill if aimed at preventing the involvement of tax exempt entities
in the purchase and operation of business enterprises. There are more
precise approaches to this problem as well as to the question of the possibly
excessive price paid by the charity or foundation."'71 Presumably, the
Court was referring to section 503(c)(4) I.R.C. with regard to the
"charity end" of the excessive price issue. That subsection provides that
an exempt organization which makes a substantial purchase of property
for more than an adequate consideration thereby forfeits its exemption.
The more precise approach to the "seller end" of the problem suggested by
the majority might consist of an attack directed specifically at the exces-
sive price issue in lieu of the broadly-based argument in Clay Brown
that the sales agreement resulted in a conversion of future income into
capital gain. But even if this more precise argument is made, the
poignancy of Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent cannot be disregarded.
7 2
IV.
OTHER TAX IMPLICATIONS OF A SALE AND LEASEBACK
A. Rental Deductions of Operating Company
Aside from challenging the "seller and charity ends" of the sale
and leaseback arrangement, attack can also be directed at the rental
70. See Kolkey v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958), where the agree-
ment involved was struck down as a sham transaction. In that case, the price was
grossly excessive within Mr. Justice Goldberg's definition of that term. (In Kolkey,
the purchase price was $14,000,000 approximately four times the fair market value of
the seller's business which was estimated to be $1,100,000.)
71. Commissioner v. Clay B. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 579 (1965).
72. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, suggested an approach invoking the alloca-
tion of the amounts received by the sellers between interest exchanged and the risk
retained by them. Capital gains treatment would be improper to the extent that the
purchase price exceeded cost plus appreciated value and the excess would be taxable
at ordinary income rates. While Mr. Justice Harlan's position might be considered
theoretically sound, practically it is incapable of application, for the valuation of
the stock of the closely-held corporation which is usually the seller in the sale and
leaseback arrangement is extremely difficult if not impossible to determine.
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deductions of the operating company.7 3 While deductions for rentals are
not limited to a reasonable amount by the Code,74 section 162 (a) (3)
requires that amounts paid as rent in order to be deductible as "ordinary
and necessary expenses" be a condition to the continued use and occu-
pancy of the property involved.
In Royal Farms Dairy Co.,75 a case involving a basic three-party
sale and leaseback, the Tax Court reduced deductible rental payments from
the 80 per cent figure specified by the parties to 50 per cent of the net
income of the operating company. A clause in the lease provided for a
reduction of the standard 80 per cent figure to 60 per cent when pay-
ments had reached a pre-determined amount deemed sufficient to insure
the foundation's ability to repay the purchase price. The Tax Court found
the 80 per cent standard figure had not been reached by negotiations
on the lease, and concluded that the operating company should only be
entitled to a deduction for the "fair rate of rental. '7 6 To the extent that
the parties intended the rentals to be an indirect method of paying the
original purchase price to the sellers, the payments could not be deducted.
In the later case of Warren Brekke,77 the Tax Court disallowed all
rental deductions to an operating company. The fact that the leased assets
were transferred to a corporation wholly-owned by the sellers approxi-
mately five and one half years after the original transaction was deemed
crucial. A similar result was reached in Estate of Sol Goldenberg,78 which
involved facts similar to those before the Court of Claims in Union Bank
v. United States, 79 a case heavily relied upon in Clay Brown. There the
court found that the primary purpose of the leaseback arrangement was
to provide the foundation with funds to satisfy its obligation to the sellers,
and reduced the 80 per cent figure established by the lease to 55 per cent.
It is clear that the operating company's rental deduction will be
subject to strong attack by the Commissioner in the future, particularly
since the percentage of profits to be paid to the foundation is usually a
standard amount specified in the leaseback arrangement. If the Commis-
sioner continues to be successful, the limitation of rental deductions to a
"fair rate of rental" will have serious implications with regard to the
three party sale and leaseback.
73. O'Neill, Sales of Businesses to Charities - The Brown Case and its After-
math, 43 TAxEs 507 (1965).
74. Stanley Immerman, 7 T.C. 1030 (1946).
75. 40 T.C. 172 (1963).
76. A fair rental is an amount which will provide a fair return on the capital
investment and which will allow recovery of the capital investment loss through
depreciation. The existence of expert testimony as to a "fair rate of rental" is crucial
in cases attempting to cut down the operating company's rental deduction. In some
instances the lack of this type of evidence may preclude consideration of the rental
issue. See Oscar C. Stahl, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 996 (1963); Isis Windows, Inc.,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 837 (1963).
77. 40 T.C. 789 (1964).
78. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 810 (1964).
79. See note 44, supra.
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B. Effect of the Revenue Act of 1964
Several provisions of the Revenue Act of 1964 are relevant to the
sale and leaseback transaction.80 Section 483(d), which is aimed at the
normal arrangement whereby the foundation gives a non-interest bearing
note for the purchase price of the sellers' stock, provides for the imposi-
tion of interest on deferred payments at the rate of 5 per cent compounded
semi-annually where the contract fails to designate any part of the pay-
ments as interest. Sections 1245 and 1250 are relevant with regard to the
liquidation sale. They provide for ordinary income taxation of that por-
tion of the sales price or fair value of depreciable property which repre-
sents a recapture of depreciation. It has been estimated that Section
1245 alone would have resulted in a tax on Clay Brown and Company
as of the date of liquidation of approximately $150,000.1 The effect of
this tax will surely be reflected in higher purchase prices in the future
and, as the interest imposed on deferred payments by section 483(d), will
provide a deterrence to the continued use of bootstrap devices.
V.
CONCLUSION
As the situation now stands, it is clear that the sale and leaseback
can be employed in the normal case as an effective means of tax avoidance
while exposing the vendors to a minimum of risk. It is also apparent that
the public in general (via our system of progressive taxation) is the
ultimate loser where the leaseback arrangement is utilized. The charity's
use of its preferential position to secure "business income," and the
seller's use of special tax treatment to secure capital gains on a "sale" of
assets, while within the "letter of the law," are surely not consistent with
the policy behind it. These inadequacies are attributable in great measure
to a lack of legislative adeptness in the area, and are reflected in judicial
decisions which place prime importance upon the "expressed will of
Congress." The Treasury Department has indicated that it intends to
propose legislation aimed at tax abuses flowing from the activities of
exempt foundations. 82 The emphasis of future litigation will most likely
be directed at the charity's tax exemption and the rental deduction of the
operating company.8 3 It will be interesting, indeed, to follow the results
of these efforts.
Louis F. Nicharot
80. See Dauber, Jewell & Hall, op. cit. supra note 4, at 3.
81. Ibid.
82. Treasury Department Report on Private Foundations, (February 2, 1965).
83. Tech. Inf. Rel. 768 (October 5, 1965).
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